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REJECTION OF THE COMPENSATORY REMEDY
WITH RESPECT TO
THE RIGHT TO A SPEEDY TRIAL:
THE CONCLUSION OF THE
MARION-BARKER-STRUNK TRILOGY
by JOHN R. WIDEIKIS*
INTRODUCTION

Although the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the
United States guarantees the right to a speedy trial in terms
absolute and unequivocal,' perhaps it is because of the deceptive
simplicity of the right itself that federal courts of appeal continue
to be presented with numerous cases involving claims that the
right has been denied. While the right to a speedy trial is equally
applicable to and invoked by the guilty and the innocent, it is only
the defendant ultimately found guilty at trial who raises the issue
on appeal.
The right to a speedy trial largely developed through various
decisions of the federal courts of appeal, for the United States
Supreme Court, by its own admission 2 has addressed itself to
speedy trial issues on few occasions. Of late, however, the Supreme Court has recognized the pressing need for a definitive
statement on the nature and scope of the right to a speedy trial.
The Court's efforts to set forth the present status of the right
culminated in what may be referred to as the Marion-BarkerStrunk trilogy.
It is not within the scope of this article to analyze the de4
cisions of United States v. Marion3 and Barker v. Wingo. Comment should be made, however, on the general principles contained in and taken from those cases.
MARION AND BARKER
Faced with the problem of resolving the question of when
the right to a speedy trial attaches, the Supreme Court in Marion
held - stating it in a negative fashion - that the right does not
attach until such time as one becomes an "accused."' 5 Whatever
prosecutorial delay may have occurred in a pre-accusation set* B.S., Loyola University; J.D., DePaul University School of Law.
1 U.

S. CONST., amend. VI: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused

shall 2 enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial .
Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 515 (1972).

3404 U.S. 307 (1971).
4407 U.S. 514 (1972).
5 404 U.S. at 313.
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ting, the Marion Court held that such delay cannot be considered
within the context of a Sixth Amendment speedy trial claim.6
Pre-accusation delay can only be properly scrutinized and
7
weighed in light of due process standards.
The Barker decision derives enormous importance and application in that the opinion sets forth the principal factors to
be balanced in determining whether the right to a speedy trial
has been denied." Pointing.out that speedy trial issues are to be
decided on an ad hoc basis 9 with full consideration to be given to
the unique facts of each particular case, the Supreme Court
manifest its approval of the policy that federal courts continue
to exercise broad flexibility in determining speedy trial issues.
The enunciation of the principal factors to be weighed in analyzing speedy trial issues, while not particularly startling, served
to furnish uniform general guidelines to the federal courts.
Within a period of approximately six months, 10 and perhaps
in recognition of a need to define the right to a speedy trial, the
Supreme Court resolved two broad problem areas with respect
to the Sixth Amendment right: the Court established when the
right to a speedy trial attached, and it furnished a flexible formula by which issues of denial of the right were to be determined.
There remained one further issue for the Supreme Court to
resolve in order to logically complete the speedy trial right
trilogy: the Supreme Court would have to determine what remedy
should be applied upon a finding that the right to a speedy trial
had been denied. The case of United States v. Strunk': provided the vehicle by which the Supreme Court would arrive at
the completion of that task.
STRUNK
The decision in United States v. Strunk12 remains significant and warrants attention for two reasons:
First, the decision by the Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit represents the first instance in which any federal court
of appeals, with the single exception of the Court of Appeals for
6

[I]t is either a formal indictment or information or else the actual

restraints imposed by arrest and holding to answer a criminal charge
that engage the particular protections of the speedy trial provision of

the Sixth Amendment.
404 U.S. at 320.
7Id. at 324.
8 407 U.S. at 530-33.
9 Id. at 530.
10 The Marion and Barker decisions were promulgated on December 20,
1.971 and June 22, 1972, respectively.
11467 F.2d 969 (7th Cir. 1972).
12 Id.
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the District of Columbia,"' found a denial of a speedy federal
trial. By so finding, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
dramatically broke from the negative tradition of federal courts
of appeal, excepting that of the District of Columbia, which
seemingly had held as a matter of unarticulated policy that a
denial of a speedy federal trial could not be found on review.
An examination of all the cases decided by federal courts of appeal which involved an issue of denial of a speedy federal trial,
excepting that of the District of Columbia, reveals that such
issues were raised in the various circuits over three hundred
times. Until the decision in United States v. Strunk, 4 the denial
of a speedy federal trial had never been found.
Second, the decision represents what appears to be one of
the first applications of the balancing test enunciated in the
Barker decision by a federal court of appeals. Though United
States v. Strunk 5 was ultimately reversed by the Supreme Court,
the reversal was predicated solely upon the issue of the remedy
to redress denial of the right to a speedy trial. It is emphatically
clear that the Seventh Circuit decision represents a proper application of the balancing test in Barker.
A single issue was framed and presented to the Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit:
Was the appellant, a prisoner in the custody of a state jurisdiction at the time of his federal indictment, denied his right to a
speedy trial, as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States of America, by virtue of a delay of
three hundred six days between the return and filing of said federal
indictment and the date of appellant's trial, where said delay was
in no way attributable, in whole or in part, to the conduct or
activities of the appellant or appellant's counsel?16
Three weeks after oral argument in the Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit, the Supreme Court decided the case of
Barker v. Wingo." In addressing itself to the issue before it,
the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit acknowledged that
the Barker decision was clearly applicable to and controlling of
the issue under consideration in Strunk.18 The Court of Appeals
concluded that, under the balancing test enunciated in Barker,
Is See: United States v. Rucker, 464 F.2d 823 (D.C. Cir. 1972); United

States v. Dunn, 459 F.2d 1115 (D.C. Cir. 1972) ; Coleman v. United States,
442 F.2d 150 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Ward v. United States, 346 F.2d 423 (D.C.
Cir. 1965); Marshall v. United States, 337 F.2d 119 (D.C. Cir. 1964);

Williams v. United States, 250 F.2d 19 (D.C. Cir. 1957) ; Taylor v. United
States, 238 F.2d 259 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
14467 F.2d 969 (7th Cir. 1972).
15 Id.
16Brief for Appellant in United States v. Strunk, 467 F.2d 969 (7th

Cir. 1972).
17407 U.S. 514 (1972).

18 467 F.2d at 971.
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Strunk had been "denied a speedy trial to his prejudice."

9

Having so concluded, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit was faced with what was at that time a unique finding a finding that created the problem of having to fashion a proper
remedy to correct the constitutional wrong done Strunk. In reflecting upon the remedy to be applied, the Court of Appeals
observed:
The remedy for a violation of this constitutional right has
traditionally been the dismissal of the indictment or the vacation
of the sentence. Perhaps the severity of that remedy has caused
courts to be extremely hesitant in finding a failure to afford a
speedy trial.2°
The observation of the Court of Appeals with respect to the
hesitancy of courts to find a denial of a speedy trial, presumably
even when one is clearly demonstrated on facts, because of an

aversion to the severity of the remedy for the denial of a constitutional right deemed to be "one of the most basic rights preserved by our Constitution, 2 1 stands, if accurate, as a sad commentary and serious indictment of the courts, which hold themselves out and are viewed as guardians of our constitutional

liberties and guarantees.
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit went on to
hold:
Be that as it may, we know of no reason why less drastic
relief may not be granted in appropriate cases. Here no question
is raised about the sufficiency of evidence showing defendant's
guilt, and, as we have said, he makes no claim of having been
prejudiced in presenting his defense. In these circumstances, the
vacation of the sentence and a dismissal of the indictment would
seem inappropriate. Rather, we think the proper remedy is to
remand the case to the district court with direction to enter an
order instructing the Attorney General to credit the defendant
with the period of time elapsing between the return of the indictment and the date of the arraignment. Fed. R. Crim. P. 35
provides that the district court may correct an illegal sentence
at any time. We choose to treat the sentence here imposed as
illegal to the extent of the delay we have characterized as unrea22
sonable.

One can reasonably speculate about the deliberations engaged
in by the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit after it had
found the denial of a speedy trial and while it was still faced with
the problem of fashioning the remedy to be applied. First, this
writer is of the opinion that the act of finding the denial of a
speedy trial was a profound manifestation of conscientious

judicial valor on the part of the Court of Appeals for the Seventh
19 Id. at 973.
20
21
22

Id.

Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 226 (1967).
467 F.2d 973.
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Circuit. The simple solution available to the Court of Appeals
was to preserve the negative tradition of federal courts of appeal
and find no denial of a speedy trial. But the Court of Appeals
refused to compromise its conscience. The tradition of federal
courts of appeal in not finding denials of speedy federal trials
with such perfect consistency suggests one or more of the following: the facts are always manifestly against defendants; or
federal district courts are infallible in their collective judgment
with respect to determinations of speedy trial issues; or federal
courts of appeal adamantly refuse to find denials of the right
because of a fear that the guilty will go free.
Having satisfied its conscience with respect to Strunk's
claim that he was denied a speedy federal trial, the Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit had yet three other factors to
evaluate and consider: Strunk had been tried; he had not been
prejudiced in his defense; and in the course of a legally sufficient
trial, he had been found guilty as charged. Thus, the Court of Appeals fashioned and applied a remedy which would return to
Strunk what the Government had taken away, namely the
period of time elapsing between his indictment and arraignment.
The remedy molded by the Court of Appeals seemed to appease the protectional needs of both Strunk and society. The
Court of Appeals felt that Strunk was entitled to the time he had
lost because of the denial of his right to a speedy trial; society
was entitled to the conviction-of a man who was clearly substantively guilty.
Following the Seventh Circuit's denial of a petition for rehearing solely on the issue of remedy, a petition for a writ of
certiorari was filed with the United States Supreme Court. It
was hoped that a challenge could be made to the remedy applied
by the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. In view of
what was then a newfound interest in the right to a speedy trial
on the part of the Supreme Court, the petition for a writ of
certiorari was framed in a fashion that invited the Supreme
Court to complete the trilogy it had begun with the Marion and
Barker decisions.
Certiorari was granted, and the issue presented to the
Supreme Court was as follows:
Whether a court, in reviewing a cause after trial, conviction,
and sentence, and finding expressly that a defendant has been
denied a speedy trial to his prejudice,
a. is required, under the principles of the Sixth Amendment
to discharge absolutely from his sentence a defendant so denied; or,
b. is required, under the principles of the Sixth Amendment
to the Constitution of the United States, to reverse the con-
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viction, vacate the sentence, and dismiss the indictment of a
defendant so denied; or,
c. may engage a remedy, consistent with the principles of the
Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States,
by which a defendant so denied is credited with the period of
unreasonable delay, attributed to the prosecution,2 which originally gave rise to his denial of a speedy trial. .1
With the sole issue of remedy for denial of the right to a
speedy trial before the Supreme Court, Chief Justice Warren E.
Burger, in writing the unanimous opinion of the Court, recogissue, not
nized that the case presented "a novel and unresolved
2' 4
"
Court.
this
of
decisions
prior
controlled by any
Although the brief for petitioner Strunk addressed itself
solely to the issue of remedy for denial of the right, and while
no oral argument was had on the question of whether the Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit had made a proper determination and finding of a denial of the right, the Supreme Court
made passing reference to the propriety of finding a denial of
the Sixth Amendment right. Contrary to the finding of the
Court of Appeals, which had expressly held that no part of the
post-indictment delay in the case was attributable to Strunk,2'
the Supreme Court thought that it was "clear that petitioner was
responsible for a large part of the ten-month delay which oc-

curred .

"26

However, the Supreme Court was not inclined to entertain
the question of whether the determination by the Court of Appeals that Strunk had been denied a speedy trial was an improper
finding. Perhaps, recognizing that a delay of three hundred six
days between indictment and trial was a relatively short period
of delay by speedy trial standards, the Supreme Court simply
did not wish to give an affirmative indication that it viewed such
a period of delay as likely to give rise to the denial of a speedy
trial. In any event, the Supreme Court held that "in the absence
of a cross-petition for certiorari, questioning the holding that
petitioner was denied a speedy trial, the only question properly
before us for review is the propriety of the remedy fashioned by
the Court of Appeals. 12 7 The Supreme Court felt compelled to
assume that the Government deliberately elected to allow the
case to be resolved on the issue of remedy only, in view of the
Government's election not to cross-petition on the issue of the
Brief for Petitioner in Strunk v. United States, 412 U.S. 434 (1973).
U.S. 434, 435.
Although the defendant may have contributed to some of the
25
delay in bringing the indictment by considering the invocation of Rule
20, he certainly contributed nothing to the delay thereafter.
467 F.2d at 972.
26 412 U.S. at 436.
2
7 Id. at 437.
23

24 412
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finding of a denial of a speedy trial by the Court of Appeals. "The Supreme Court also was not inclined to validate the
utilization of a compensatory remedy for a denial of the right to
a speedy trial, that is, a remedy which credits the sentence imposed with the period of delay attributable to the Government
in bringing the accused to trial, even though a compensatory
remedy might be construed to be flexible in its application to
a given circumstance appearing to warrant its application. As
the Supreme Court pointed out, the standards enunciated in
Barker were 'flexible' standards based on practical considerations."'"
Further, the aspect of flexible standards in Barker
was "directed at the process of determining whether a denial
of speedy trial had occurred; it did not deal with the remedy for
denial of this right." 30
The Supreme Court recognized that "[biy definition, such
denial is unlike some of the other guarantees of the Sixth
Amendment.' 31 The Court was aware that the unique feature
of the right to a speedy trial is that once lost, it is forever lost.
Drawing a distinction between the right to a speedy trial and
other Sixth Amendment rights, the Supreme Court stated that
the "failure to afford a public trial, an impartial jury, notice of
charges, or compulsory service can ordinarily be cured by pro'32
viding those guaranteed rights in a new trial.
The nature of the guarantee of the right to a speedy trial is
such that it recognizes that "a prolonged delay may subject the
accused to an emotional stress that can be presumed to result in
the ordinary person from uncertainties in the prospect of facing
public trial or of receiving a sentence longer than, or consecutive
to, the one he is presently serving - uncertainties that a prompt
trial removes. ' 33 The Court added that "the stress from a delayed trial may be less on a prisoner already confined, whose
family ties and employment have been interrupted, but other
factors such as the prospect of rehabilitation may also be affected adversely. ' 34 Furthermore, while it was aware that an
accused who is released pending trial frequently has little interest, if any, in being tried quickly, the Court went on to emphasize that "this, standing alone, does not alter the prosecutor's
obligation to see to it that the case is brought on for trial."'
Chief Justice Burger, well noted for his active interest in pro28

Id.

29 Id.
30 Id.

at 438.

31 Id. at 438-39.
32 Id. at 439.
33
34
3
5

Id.
Id.
Id.

at 439 n. 2.
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ruoting the effective administration of criminal justice, went on
to observe:
The desires or convenience of individuals cannot be controlling.
The public interest in a broad sense, as well as the constitutional
guarantee, command prompt disposition of criminal charges:86
In concluding, the Court clearly pointed out that the dismissal of an indictment because of a denial of the right to a
speedy trial can be described as an "unsatisfactorily severe
remedy." 3 In terms of the practical application of dismissal of
the indictment as a remedy, the Court observed that "in practice, 'it means that a defendant who may be guilty of a serious
crime will go free, without having been tried.' ",8 However, the
Court held that such severe remedies are not unique in the application of constitutional standards. Stating the logical extension of the trend that began with the decisions marked by
Marion and Barker, the Court held that dismissal of the indictment must remain "the only possible remedy."8' 9
By examining the mechanics of making a speedy trial claim,
the logic of the Court's conclusion followed so forcefully that the
task of fashioning an appropriate remedy for the denial of a
speedy trial became a less difficult one.
The issue of denial of a speedy trial is crystallized by a
defendant's motion to dismiss a charge against him on the ground
of denial of the constitutional right to a speedy trial. It is precisely at the time that the defendant makes a motion to dismiss
the indictment that the facts to be weighed in the balancing test
enunciated in Barker ° are sealed. For this reason, a retrospective fact analysis must be applied in the determination of the
issue, and any consideration given by the trial judge to prospective facts, as likely as they may be, are improper to an examination of whether a defendant has been denied the right. Further,
since the motion to dismiss the indictment is properly made
after arraignment and before trial, the defendant, pursuant to
an entered plea of not guilty, is presumed innocent until proven
guilty in accordance with due process of law.
In finding that a defendant has been denied his right to a
36 Id.
37Id. at 439.
38 Id. The Court was citing to its non-controlling commentary in
Barker:

The amorphous quality of the right leads to the unsatisfactorily severe
remedy of dismissal of the indictment when the right has been deprived. This is indeed a serious consequence because it means that a
defendant who may be guilty of a serious crime will go free, without
having been tried. Such a remedy is more serious than an exclusionary
rule or a reversal for a new trial, but it is the only possible remedy
[footnote omitted].
407 U.S. at 522.
39 412 U.S. at 440.
40

407 U.S. at 530-33.
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speedy trial, a federal district court, under the balancing test in
Barker, will necessarily have to conclude:
1. that the length of the delay complained of by the defendant was relatively long in light of the nature of the
crime charged;
2. that the delay was not attributable to the defendant, but
was attributable to the prosecutor, and the prosecutor
could offer no acceptable reason for the delay;
3. that the defendant properly asserted his right and had
not waived it; and
4. that the defendant was subjected to some form of
recognized speedy trial prejudice.
When a federal court of appeals reviews a district court's
denial of a defendant's motion for dismissal of an indictment
for want of a speedy trial, the court of appeals must assume a
positional perspective identical to that of the district court whose
judgment it is reviewing. Like the district court, the federal
court of appeals is bound to a retrospective fact analysis of the
facts existing at the time the motion to dismiss was originally
made. In applying the balancing test, the federal court of appeals must weigh the same facts, and only the same facts, which
were available to the district court at the time the district court
made its ruling on the motion. It is only in this manner that a
federal court of appeals can properly assert that a district court
was correct or incorrect in denying a motion to dismiss.
When a federal court of appeals makes the determination
that a denial of a speedy trial has occurred, it can only apply the
remedy that the district court could have applied in the first
instance. A compensatory remedy is clearly beyond the power
of a district court. To impose such a remedy, a district court
states, in effect: "A denial of the constitutional right to a speedy
trial has been found, however, the defendant shall stand trial;
in the event he is found guilty, his sentence will be appropriately
credited with the period of delay attributable to the Government in bringing the defendant to trial."
In the event that a defendant is acquitted, he is left without
a remedy. The absence of a remedy inescapably follows because
a district court or the court of appeals which is bound to the
positional perspective of the district court cannot credit the trial
delay where, because of the acquittal, no sentence is imposed.
CONCLUSION

It seems likely to this writer that the Marion-Barker-Strunk
trilogy will continue to serve federal courts of appeal for some
time. Perhaps the Supreme Court believes that the promulga-

262

The John Marshall Journal of Practice and Procedure

[Vol. 7 :253

tion of the trilogy will preclude the necessity for the Court to
rule on speedy trial issues for the present. Federal courts of
appeal, as well as district courts, are well reminded by Strunk
of what the finding of a denial of speedy trial represents an unpleasant reminder that the Government, while fully able to
try a defendant, permitted that opportunity to be squandered.
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